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THE
IMPACT OF XENOPHOBIC ATTACKS ON NIGERIA-SOUTH AFRICA RELATION
Ige,
kehinde Moses
Department
of Political Science
Faculty
of Social Sciences, University of Lagos
Akoka,
Lagos State, Nigeria
Abstract
It
was projected that the post-apartheid South Africa would usher in a new state
that is free of racial segregation but, what ensued was the constriction and
prejudice against foreigners (particularly black Africans) living in South
Africa. At these hazardous and perilous moments in South Africa, xenophobic
attacks have inevitably caused a lot of fears and worries in the mind of people
living within and outside the country. In fact, pathetically and emotionally,
it has drastically discouraged Nigerians and many other foreign investors to
come to South Africa. It is on this backdrop that this paper critically takes a
look at the impact of xenophobic attacks on Nigeria-South Africa relations. This
study would empirically be explored using the qualitative method of data
collection. Also used were the historical approach to the study and the
Rational Choice Theory as the theoretical framework.
Keywords:
Xenophobia, Apartheid, Nigeria, South Africa
The post-apartheid South Africa which
was inaugurated in 1994 presented a new state of racially free and
de-segregated society which was a fundamental departure from the highly
constricted and polarized society dominated by white minority in the past. This
dramatic twist introduced a new dimension to the segregation, discrimination
and prejudice that dominated the history of South Africa. This time around
however, the victims became foreigners living in South Africa. Regrettably,
occurrences suggest institutional connivance as the causal effect of this
prejudice (Isike and Isike, 2012). The new South Africa christened “Rainbow
Nation” was believed to herald the birth of “Africa Renaissance” which would usher
in cross-cultural boundlessness in Africa and foster regional cohesion. In
contrast, the feeling about what “African Renaissance” would bring was lost and
replaced with Africa Crucifixion by the virtue of the perpetual racial
intolerance and dislike for Nigerians living in South Africa and foreigners.
This perpetual racial intolerance and violent
attacks on Nigerians living in South Africa has generated local and
international condemnation. Advertently, this study thus brings to the fore the
core issues of racial intolerance and dislike for foreigners, particularly
Nigerians in South Africa, within the broader historical framework of the
apartheid regime and the post-apartheid socio-economic relations which have
over time shaped the existential notions of false community, vague entitlement
and vague sense of belonging amongst a number of black South Africans. Indeed,
the issue of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa in my view is profound
psychosomatic carryovers and the negative product of the apartheid regime that
cannot be wished away from the collective consciousness of the people of the rainbow
nation. This was as a result of a re-orientation of black South Africans sequel
to the post apartheid era. This is even more so, given the attendant
dispossession of their heritage and personal pride by the despicable and
repugnant apartheid regime, which exploited and segregated them in their own
lands. The reality of these historical facts has continued to obstruct the
wheel of progress and development especially within the black communities in
South Africa; considering the fact that “xenophobia” is a vice that often
manifests into a show of aggression against black foreigners by black South
Africans. Furthermore, the political crisis of that dark era led to social
dislocation, which in turn affected their economic, educational and
socio-cultural advancement and developing the required
skill sets that would have prepared them for high-level jobs and proper
integration into a new South Africa promising a brighter future.
That being said, while xenophobic
violence is not a new phenomenon in post-apartheid South Africa, the sudden
explosion of violence has been attributed to a combination of factors which
include local political pressures over time, increases in prices of basic
goods, high levels of unemployment estimated at 25 percent and growing concerns
and frustrations at the inability of the South African government under erstwhile
President Jacob Zuma to provide essential services to poor people and the
resultant economic hardship and tensions surrounding crime and competition over
scarce resources by non-national population. The continued socio-economic
issues are pushing the average Black South African into extreme poverty in the
midst of plenty and there is a high level of dissatisfaction with the scheme of
things after the fall of the apartheid regime.
It would be recalled that between May
and June 2008, there were 135 separate violent incidents that left people dead,
at least 670 wounded and unfortunately, dozens were carnally assaulted and many
properties destroyed and looted. At this junction, it would be justifiable to
add that the South Africa domestic environment has not been helping matters as
it is has not kept privy that it has been hostile to non- nationals
particularly, undocumented migrants; and there is implicit culture of impunity –
which encourages mob justice in most communities. Interestingly, South African
state security institutions such as the police and immigration service show no
sympathy to black settlers from other African countries - from the
aforementioned, it appears that xenophobia is institutionalized and systemic in
South Africa. This attitude generated the questions which include: To what
extent can South Africa's inconsistent immigration policy be blamed for
xenophobia? Do foreigners really 'steal' South African jobs? Do foreign-owned
small businesses have an unfair advantage over those owned by South Africans?
What South African government and state security institutions have to
comprehend with is that people migrating in search of safer and more prosperous
living conditions is as old as man and the right for any person to leave any
country is enshrined in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination.
1.
Statement
of the Problem
South Africa’s domestic environment has
been hostile to non-nationals, particularly, undocumented migrants and as such,
there is an implicit culture of impunity, which encourages mob justice in most
communities. Incontrovertibly and indubitably, this unfriendly disposition
towards non-nationals has subsequently established South Africa as one of
Africa’s most dangerous countries to live in. Hence, Nigerians and foreign business
owners are usually attacked during xenophobic attacks. At these hazardous and perilous
moments in South Africa, xenophobic attacks have inevitably caused a lot of
fears and worries, negative feelings in the minds of people living within and
outside the country. In fact, pathetically and emotionally, it has drastically discouraged
Nigerians and many other foreign investors to come to South Africa. This has subsequently
put strain in the relationship between and Nigeria and South Africa; and the
country’s economic development. It has also put the country itself in a state of
perplexity, bewilderment and puzzlement. Despite the country having vibrant, brilliant policies and a framework that
can handle criminal offences or perpetrators of various attacks – these virtues
have not been effectively transformed into reducing xenophobic attacks on
Nigerians in South Africa. One major problem that arises out of this
ineffectiveness is a strenuous relationship between Nigeria-South Africa partnerships
over years. Beyond this strenuous relationship is lack of mutual diplomatic and
tactful reciprocity on the part of the South Africa government and the
country’s non-state actors for the strategic role Nigeria played in the
struggle against apartheid. It is therefore pertinent to assess the pitfalls or
effects of xenophobic attacks on South Africa’s economic state of affairs; and
imperative to explore whatsoever diplomatic crisis between Nigeria and South Africa.
2.
Theoretical
Framework
According to the Rational Choice theory,
the rivalry between foreign migrants and locals for scarce resources leads to
xenophobia (Wimmer, 1997). Xenophobia, not only in South Africa but also in other
countries, is commonly justified on the grounds of economic necessity.
According to Steinberg (2008), the economy is conceptualized as a finite lump:
the assumption then is that access to resources is a zero-sum game and this
breeds conflict. Relating this to foreigners, Steinberg (2008) explains that
successful foreigners are perceived to prosper by benefiting unrightfully from
national resources that belong to South Africans. Consequently, seeing
foreigners prosper without any assistance from the state “upsets one’s
conception of one’s own relation to the state and what one’s entiments are”
(Steinberg, 2008).
South Africans perceive foreigners as “competing
with them for jobs, housing and other resources to which they themselves feel
entitled to” (Dodson, 2010). This is played out against a background of poverty,
high unemployment and high income inequality between the rich and the poor.
Fears of perceived foreign domination in the job market create conflict and
make people feel that labor immigration should be limited and that the
government is not doing enough to reduce the number of foreign migrants. The
perceived competition for economic opportunities is associated with unskilled and
casual jobs in the domestic sphere, on farms, construction sites, in the
hospitality and informal sectors. It is believed that migrants undercut
citizens in these sectors where they are willing to work for less pay and for
longer hours. In so doing, they also encourage employers to get away with
unfair labor practices.
Rational choice theory is widely
accepted as an explanation for xenophobia in South Africa both at the individual
and collective levels. This is supported by the results of a 2009 survey
conducted by the Gauteng City-Region Observatory (2009). The survey, which
investigated satisfaction and quality of life among 6,636 Gauteng residents and
those of selected areas in neighboring provinces, uncovered xenophobic
attitudes that cut across race, class and sex. A total of 69% of the
respondents were in agreement that foreigners are taking benefits that are
meant for South Africans. However, the relationship between xenophobia and a
drop in wages or rising unemployment - both economic indicators of intensive
competition in the labor market has not been scientifically tested in South
Africa. Therefore, rational choice theory is not based on indicators of intensive
competition in the economy but on perceptions of illegitimate competition,
which has led to resentment of Nigerians and other migrants. While the rational
choice theory has laid into explaining the hostile treatment unleashed by South
Africans towards non-nationals and the purported institutionalized xenophobia
in South Africa, it does not yet explain the conditions which gave rise to the
negative perception of migrants given that other countries welcome migrants into
their societies because of the positive contributions they make to the economy.
3.
An
Historical Overview of Nigeria-South Africa Relations
The history of the Nigeria-South Africa
relations could be traced to events arising from the Sharpeville massacre of 21st
March, 1960, when the South African police shot and killed 72 blacks and
wounded 184 (Zabadi and Onuoha, 2012; Akinboye, 2013). This event which
occurred even before Nigeria’s independence marked the beginning of Nigeria’s
confrontation against white South Africa. The Tafawa Balewa government
(1960-1966) upon assumption of office in October 1, 1960 was faced with
overwhelming pressure from both domestic and external sources to institute
measures to check South Africa’s apartheid policies. Consequently, Nigeria
banned the importation of South African goods into the country and was instrumental
to the political and economic sanctions passed against the racist regime.
Furthermore, Balewa went to the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ Conference in
March 1961 in London, where he spearheaded the move that led to the withdrawal
of South Africa from the Commonwealth (Aluko, 1982). By 1962, Nigeria
terminated all the privileges of Commonwealth membership which South Africans
enjoyed in Nigeria. The Nigerian government’s anti-apartheid policy continued
until the first republic was ousted by Major Nzeogwu’s-led military coup in
January 15, 1966. The military coup of January 15, 1966 which seized power from
the Balewa’s regime brought Aguiyi Ironsi’s transition to the helm of affairs.
The brief administration of General Ironsi between January-July 1966 did not
record any substantial policy against the apartheid regime in South Africa, due
largely to the volatile security situation in Nigeria that was precipitated by
the coup (Ademoyega, 1981).
Following the take-over of the reins of
government in Nigeria in July 29, 1966 by the military-led administration of
Yakubu Gowon after the assassination of General Aguiyi Ironsi, a slightly
modified policy towards South Africa was adopted. The new policy which was
based on boycott and confrontation with white minority regime in South Africa
led to a proclamation declaring white South Africans prohibited immigrants in
Nigeria. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 further deepened the crisis on the
Nigeria-South Africa relations, upon realization that South Africa was sabotaging
the efforts of Nigeria in the war. Yakubu Gowon thus strengthened his anti-apartheid
policy, and this continued after the war when Nigeria became even much more
financially buoyant as her oil resources contributed enormous foreign currency
to her coffers than before. The country was hereby able to play a confident and
much more dynamic role in world affairs (Ajala, 1993).
The Murtala Mohammed government
(1975-1976) that ousted the Gowon administration through a coup was, right from
the outset, prepared to take radical measures in Africa’s decolonization
process. The Angolan crisis of 1975 provided an opportunity for the Nigeria
government to demonstrate her commitment to the anti-apartheid struggle by
resolving the political stalemate in the former (Fafowora, 1984; Gambari, 2008).
Following the killing of General Mohammadu in the abortive coup led by Colonel
Buka Dimka in July 1976, General Olusegun Obasanjo continued the same radical
approach in the country’s foreign policy relations with South Africa. Thus,
General Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration was widely perceived as a
continuation of Murtala Mohammed administration (Garba, 1987).
Thereafter, in the 80s, Nigeria-South Africa
relations witnessed the following phases: the civilian administration of Shehu
Shagari, and the succeeding military administrations of Muhammadu Buhari and
Ibrahim Babangida. Yet there was hardly any difference in their pursuit of
Nigeria-South Africa relations. For instance, the second republic
administration of Shehu Shagari (1979-1983) was encumbered by a number of
domestic challenges which bordered on its inability to deliver on his electoral
promises, coupled with a sharp decline in oil revenues. These two factors
largely affected the pursuit of Nigeria’s Afrocentric policies which had
serious implications on the Nigeria-South Africa relations. This was evident in
the administration’s inability to contribute financially to the fight against
apartheid in South Africa. While in the short-lived regime of Muhammadu Buhari (1983-1985),
the Afro-centric foreign policy of the Nigerian government toward South African
apartheid regime was re-vitalized, but not without serious opposition from
domestic pressure groups, which clamoured for improved standard of living for
citizens rather than rendering assistance to other African countries.
Therefore, the only appreciable impact of Nigeria-South Africa relations under
Buhari regime was the hosting of the second international conference on
apartheid, tagged “Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime” held in Lagos,
Nigeria, August 1984. In the conference, apartheid was declared illegal and the
result further heightened the pressure on apartheid regime in South Africa, and
reinforced Nigeria’s determination to eradicate all vestiges of racist regimes
in Africa.
Apartheid regime in South Africa would
appear to have been effectively tackled under Babangida’s regime (1985-1993).
The UN Anti-Apartheid Committee which had enjoyed Nigerian headship for the
better part of its existence continued its vigorous campaigns against
apartheid. At the level of the Non-Aligned Movement, the dying tempo of
decolonization was revived with a resolution for the establishment of an
African Fund at the Harare Conference in 1986, to assist the liberation of Southern
Africa as a whole, and at the Paris International Conference for sanctions
against apartheid in 1987. Nigeria, in addition to her usual financial support,
opted for tougher sanctions against the apartheid regime in South Africa
(Saliu, 2006). However, it is important to note that the requirements of
economic diplomacy compromised Babangida’s famous stand on apartheid. For
instance, Nigeria hosted the then apartheid President Frederick De Klerk in
Abuja in 1992 despite the reversible steps taken by the apartheid state towards
reforms. In essence, Babangida regime’s rhetorical approach was a mere ploy to
redeem the discredited image of his regime (Saliu, 2006).
From the foregoing, it is clear that
Nigeria’s policy towards South Africa between 1960 and 1993 was characterized
by the former’s disdain of the latter’s apartheid policy. Although Nigeria,
from independence, maintained a hostile attitude towards South Africa for more
than thirty years until the early 1990s, both countries established formal diplomatic
relations on the 21st February 1994 following the termination of
apartheid policy, the release of the African National Congress (ANC) leader,
Nelson Mandela and the conduct of general elections in South Africa. Prior to
this time, Nigeria’s Mission was operating through the Angolan High Commission
in Pretoria. Subsequently, an exchange of High Commissioners was done by the
two countries, with each acutely conscious of the fact that both countries need
each other’s support in the mutually advantageous conduct of their bilateral
relations and multilateral diplomacy in Africa (Akindele, 2007).
The post-1994 Nigeria-South Africa
relations began with a major disagreement over Nigeria’s domestic policy.
General Sani Abacha’s dictatorial military regime (1993-1998), and its decision
to hang Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight Ogoni men on the 10th of November
1995, provided the first occasion for an open diplomatic strain in the
relationship between Nigeria and South Africa at the aftermath of the apartheid
era. Consequently, upon the alleged role of South Africa in the suspension of
Nigeria from the Commonwealth at the Auckland Summit in November 1995, the
Nigerian state retaliated for the diplomatic offensive by severing diplomatic
relations with South Africa (Ibeanu and Nwachukwu, 2004; Akinterinwa, 2009).
The frosty relationship between the two countries was consequently amended by
the military regime of Abdusallam Abubakar whose reconciliatory trip to South
Africa marked the beginning of a relatively new relationship between the two
countries.
By the year 1999, Nigeria and South
Africa began to redefine their bilateral and multilateral relationships, more
so as this period coincided with democratic transitions in both countries. In
essence, the period since 1999, ushered in an era of strategic bilateral
dealings which herald the formation of Nigeria-South Africa Bi-National
Commission (BNC), inaugurated in October 1999 (Akinboye, 2005). Indeed, the
period between 2000 and 2005 witnessed a more focused and active articulation
of a strategic partnership between Nigeria and South Africa due largely to the
perceived challenges of Africa in a rapidly globalizing world. The personality
of Nigeria’s President at that time, Olusegun Obasanjo and his South African
counterpart, Thabo Mbeki, was a major contributing factor to the emerging and
cordial relationship between the two countries. Obasanjo and Mbeki perceived
the urgent need for Africa’s re-birth and they shared equal passion for the
realization of such goal (Adebajo and Landsberg, 2003).
Keying into the re-awakening of
Pan-Africanism and regional role conception by Nigeria and South Africa after
the end of the Cold War in 1989, there were concerns in policy and scholarly
circles on the need for the two countries to play major roles in conflict
mitigation and peace building in war-torn African countries. This was moreover
in view of the fact that Western countries and the United Nations began to
challenge African governments to help resolve regional conflicts in the continent.
This new stance was fuelled by the repeated complaint at the United Nations
about the shortage of funds to finance peace-keeping operations (Benneh,
2001).Another major collaborative effort by Nigeria and South Africa in
promoting continental renaissance was the facilitation of the diplomatic
process that transformed the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the
African Union (AU) in 1999. Nigeria and South Africa were also instrumental to
the formation of Africa’s new development initiative, the New Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) in 2001, and its governance tool; African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2003. The expectations by the international
community, since the year 2000, is that Africans and the continental political
leadership would look inward themselves towards solving their problems: no
doubt this expectation made those initiatives very important and timely (NEPAD,
2001).
However, in a more recent time,
Nigeria-South Africa diplomatic relations has deteriorated on many fronts,
prompting the visit of President Goodluck Jonathan to South Africa where he
addressed the latter’s joint parliament. The Presidential visit was prompted by
the yellow card fever certificate saga that involved both countries. The South
African government had on March 2, 2012 deported 125 Nigerians (75 aboard South
African Airways) and (50 aboard Arik Air Ways) for possessing fake yellow cards
fever vaccination (The Guardian Editorials, March 5, 2012:3). The Nigerian
government immediately retaliated what was generally perceived as unfair
treatment of Nigerians, indeed an affront to diplomatic norms, by deporting a
total of 128 South Africans within two days, citing ‘lack of proper
documentation’ as reasons for shutting them out (The News Editorials, March 19,
2012:50).In a related development, the arms deal that involved both countries
which came on the heels of the collapse of a building at the Synagogue of All
Nations Church, Lagos, a Nigeria-based religious centre, claiming the lives of
about 84 South African nationals became the latest in the ranks of diplomatic
embarrassment that has bedeviled the Nigeria-South relations. According to
Kayode (2014) failure on the part of the Nigerian government to officially
declare the cash of 9.3 million USD, loaded into a Nigerian-owned jet to the
South African Customs as required by the latter’s law attracted negative
diplomatic reaction from the South African government. Kayode (2014) argued
that the seizure of the cash in the custody of the Nigerian intelligence
officials who had attempted to purchase arms through the “black market”
allegedly for the prosecution of war on terror and insurgents did not violate
any international practice in the field of security and intelligence. Kayode
(2014) concluded that the diplomatic row engendered by the incident in
Nigeria-South Africa relations only portrayed the hypocrisy in the international
security structure as well as its institutions. From the aforementioned
analysis, it is evident that the history of Nigeria-South Africa relations has
vacillated between cooperation and conflict, necessitated by each country’s
foreign policy, regime type, domestic intricacies and international diplomacy.
4.
The
Impact of Xenophobic Attacks on Nigeria-South Africa Relations
Since the inauguration of the post-apartheid
South Africa in 1994 hardly did any year go by without an incidence of
xenophobic attacks on fellow blacks from other African countries by South
Africans. This inevitably brought about destruction in human and material resources
which can hardly be quantified. This ugly development unavoidably pitched South
Africa against other African countries especially Nigeria. The impacts of such attacks
against Nigerians in South Africa can be viewed from political/diplomatic,
socio-cultural and economic angle.
4.1 Political and Diplomatic Impacts
Politically, the incessant wave of xenophobic
attacks on Nigerians in South Africa has a lot of impactful implications if the
two governments fail to muster enough political will to deal with this
unbecoming situation. It can mar the ties between both countries. In diplomatic
circles, once there is a severe row between countries the next option is
recalling ambassadors and whenever there exist any breakdown of relationship
between countries, it usually take time for such to be restored and taking into
cognizance the position of Nigeria and South Africa in the African continent,
it will be also to the detriment of the progress of other African countries.
Xenophobic attacks in South Africa has received staunch criticism within and
outside Africa, following the April 2015 xenophobic attack in South Africa, the
United Nations Security Council was quick to condemn the attacks, as did her
neighbours, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi, followed suite in denouncing and
criticizing these acts (Claaassen, 2015). Nigeria on the other hand, went a
step further by recalling her ambassadors from South Africa. The xenophobic
attacks thus increased tensions between the two countries, as the Nigerian
government felt the South African government was not doing enough to protect
her citizens in South Africa, who she felt were the primary target of the
attacks. Another dimension to this is its prospect to arouse loss of African
solidarity - Africans usually regard each others as brothers and in so many
circumstances speak with one voice in the international arena, it is reasoned
that a break in relationship between Nigeria and South Africa will lead to a
divided Africa thereby limiting their chances in making wave in international
politics. Tough visa policies and restrictions also have impactful implications
on people migrating in search of safer and more prosperous living conditions.
The act of people migrating in search of greener pasture is as old as man and as
a matter of fact – it is the right of any person to migrate in search of safer
and more prosperous living conditions; as this is enshrined in the 1984
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 1965 International Convention on
the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination. This clearly depicts
people’s freedom to seek better, safer and more prosperous living conditions in
any part of the world. However, this freedom can be restricted through
stringent visa policies and it is envisaged that xenophobic attacks is capable
of making Nigeria and South Africa to adopt stringent visa policies thereby
killing the spirit of African brotherhood and making nonsense the new
Pan-African Passport and ultimately dampening the seeking and searching of
safer and more prosperous living conditions of Africans.
4.2 Socio-Cultural Impact
Having suffered from the ordeal of
colonialism from the Europeans, Africans believes after gaining of independence
and the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa that they (Africans) are
brother with common history and descent. However, the upsurge of xenophobic
attacks by South Africans towards their fellow African brothers depicts a renaissance
of past apartheid ordeal and inhumanity of colonialism. Besides the
aforementioned, other socio-cultural impactful implications of such ordeal and
inhumanity is identity crisis. Identity conflict is one of the worst forms of distress
and disorientation resulting from conflict pressures (e.g. colonialism and
apartheid) and uncertainty about one's self and one's role in society as it
affects the psychology of the victims thereby making them not to realize and
achieve their self esteem and full potentials. Another form of social impact of
xenophobic attacks is African disunity. When Africans begin to see the fellow
brothers and sisters as strangers and subsequently treating them as one: the impact
of such state of disunity is obviously disunity in a continent of brothers and
sisters that regards each other with common history and descent. The
implication of this is the obvious fear that Africans will have when in other
African countries other than their own country of birth. Insecurity also is an
impactful implication of xenophobia for when one suffered and got humiliated
socially and culturally from one’s brothers and sisters, the bad thought
arising from such alienation and humiliation may lead them into joining bad
gangs which might obviously lead to increase in security challenges within the
African continent.
4.3 Economic Impact
The economic impact of the recurring
xenophobic attacks in South Africa on Nigerians is very enormous. Fundamentally,
one of the principal reasons for xenophobic attacks in South Africa is tied to
the economy i.e. foreigners and locals competing for scarce resources. It is
the idea of South Africans to believe that citizens from African countries are
taking over their jobs and businesses leading to high rate of unemployment
especially among locals. While this argument appears to be correct but it is relatively
weak as these people are doing genuine and legal businesses in South Africa.
Equally, taking cognizance of the fact that South Africans are also doing
businesses in other African countries, it will be better imagined of there
exist reprisal attacks on South Africans in residing and doing businesses in
other African countries. The implications for the overall economy of Africa
should this scenario play out were clearly depicted by the Nigerian-South
African Chamber of Commerce. The chamber holds the view that the outbreak of
xenophobic violence in South Africa and the reprisal events in Nigeria,
including direct attack on foreign-owned businesses in both South Africa and
Nigeria poses a threat to Africa’s fragile economic recovery and development. It
will be equally instructive to note that attacks on businesses in Nigeria and
South Africa will obviously bring about job losses, a development which might
make the attack victims to be easy prey to terrorist organizations thereby aggravating
the already worst security situations in both countries and Africa at large.
Today in Nigeria and South Africa most of the crimes committed are usually
perpetuated by the youths with the high rate of unemployment as a major factor.
Indisputably, the South African state of
xenophobic attacks is disturbing and worrying the minds and feelings of many
people not only those residing in South Africa or outside the country but also
the citizens themselves (Mistry 2004). As it is often seen and regularly
observed that the South Africans themselves were largely living in perpetual
fear as they feel they could be the next victims of attacks by the foreign nationals
or fear that the foreign nationals could retaliate terribly, and have massive
support from the other powerful nations. If care is not taken, it might lead to
war among nations. Claassen (2015) cites that some South Africans were victims
of xenophobic attacks, some for not participating in the movement, while other
victims were mistakenly judged as foreigners. As regards investment, Oyelana
(2015) also reveals that, the majority of foreign investors have lost
confidence in the police and the judiciary that fail to protect them. In this regard,
the majority of foreign investors lack community security. Consequently, this
increases foreign investors’ exposure to abuse, crime and extortion by
individuals and community leaders as revealed by Charman et al. (2012). Foreign investors were therefore, forced to rely almost
completely on the authorized institutes of justice and they are hindered by
lack of trust and faith in the police and courts aggravated by cultural and
language barriers. Charman et al.
(2012) revealed that the police and prosecutor statements usually focus
specifically on foreign investors. Regarding the lengthy justice process and
foreign investors’ victims of crime, it is often seen that the prosecutors and
police also faced difficulties in communicating and keeping them engaged during
court processes. Hence, according to Charman and Piper (2012), the study
revealed there were various forms of violence feared by foreign investors
during xenophobic attacks, following the categories used by the South African
Police Service (SAPS) which includes: murder; attempted murder; robbery; theft;
assault.
Besides, in reality, every country is
aware of how powerful investments are to their economies. Candidly speaking,
any country that does not consider foreign investments as one or part of her economic
growth and development priority, is definitely digging for her economic
collapse. Observably, some African countries such as Nigeria, Ghana and
Zimbabwe have previously implemented xenophobic attacks and this definitely reflected
on their economies after sending foreign investors back to their countries. In fact,
they regretted their actions and undiplomatic decisions taken against foreign
nationals residing in their countries. In addition, the execution of impromptu
xenophobic attacks by Nigerians, Ghanaians and Zimbabweans against foreign
investors residing in their countries have, however, largely dissuaded many who
may wish to invest in their economies (Atsenuwa and Adepoju, 2010; Posen and Ross,
2012). This incontrovertibly implies that xenophobic attacks negatively affect
the countries’ direct foreign investments. Since xenophobic attacks victimize
those who fall casualties of the observable fact, this devastatingly,
tremendously and overwhelmingly prompts the need to question the government in
the areas of its country’s policy and its legislative environment for possible
gaps, and also assess how the victims of xenophobic attacks are compensated or
treated (Crisp, 2010; Laubeova, 2012). This is because every citizen, whether
South African citizens or foreign nationals, in fact, irrespective of any
country one comes from has inalienable rights to be protected and live
successively in such a country, provided that one has legal rights to stay
either temporarily or permanently. More importantly and constitutionally, no
one should take laws in his or her hands to send anybody back to his or her
country unless such person(s) has (have) been tried and found guilty by a
competent law court of such country for committing an offense that warrants the
verdict of the court on deportation. South Africa being one of the fast
developing countries in the world, the rights of all citizens is gallantly and
courteously well established in the country’s bill of rights and supreme
constitution (Republic of South Africa 1996). However, recent evidence suggests
that the South Africa economic situation or state of affairs is uneven and
fluctuating due to inhospitable government policies designed to safeguard
foreign investments and as a result, this has hindered huge investment
opportunities. There is a need to encourage other investors from different
countries such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh, Somalia, Pakistan, Nigeria and Ghana
among others to invest in her economy.
The observable fact remains that those
perpetrators who actually participate in these acts of xenophobic attacks have undoubtedly
contributed to the downfall of the economic development of South Africa either
directly or vice-versa. Devastatingly in South Africa, as soon as these
perpetrators are arrested and sentenced, they are often not allowed to serve
the appropriate jail term for the nature of the crimes committed; and after a short
while, they are often released to walk free in the country. This is a pointer
to the fact that South African laws are very lenient on these perpetrators and
in fact there is a need for the South African government to review her judicial
system and amend some laws as this could be one of the best ways or strategies
to improve and strengthen her economic development. Seemingly, either the
system is too compassionate, sympathetic, empathetic and merciful to the offenders,
uncaring and unsympathetic to follow all the professionally, lawfully and
legitimately due process to ensure fairness to the victims, and do justice to
the culprits of the crime, or is disregarding the rights of the offenders (DeVilliers,
2006; Jaishankar, 2014). Prominently, recent evidence suggests that South
African citizens alone cannot do all by themselves to enhance their current
economic state of affairs. Apparently, the fact remains that for any country to
improve or maintain success or progress economically in this Global economic
dispensation, there is a substantial or considerable need to be in good accord with
other nationals residing in the country, investing one another’s economy and
welcoming foreign nationals into their country with passion; in peace,
tranquility and to learn how to live with different people in harmony. In fact,
it is very important to emphasize at this juncture that any country executing
xenophobic attacks would definitely have a propensity to experience poverty. It
is very sad to state clearly that many African countries do not have a deep
knowledge or clear understanding of what poverty means. In fact, some African
leaders believe that embarking on xenophobic attacks would solve their identified
economic problems, make them self-reliant and have full control of all their
economic resources (Kasochi 2013). Considering a popular saying that “a tree cannot
make a forest” it thus suffices to assert that a country cannot grow or develop
on its own; seeing that no state; no matter how technologically advanced,
financially buoyant or blessed with natural resources is self-sufficient.but
must be able and willing to accommodate
new opportunities such as foreign investments, new technologies from abroad,
billion dollar innovations and ideas, good vision and mission, as well as the
basics such as the labour that foreign
nationals bring into the country. It should also be noted that different
foreign investments would bring about new and brilliant business ideas, which
would invariably bring about empowerment to South African natives and as a result,
there would be many employment opportunities to accommodate huge numbers of
local citizens who are unemployed as well as the unskilled workers in South
Africa. These are potentials that tend
to revolutionize the economy of a nation considered South Africa is able to
channel the values, labor and the education of these foreign nations which will
in turn create ripples of development, productivity and stability to her
Economy.
However, discussing poverty has a dependent
variable, it can be said that its impacts cut across racial lines as it varied
effects on the white and black populace. Claassen (2015) explains through a
survey research on the subject matter that past experiences of poverty can be
seen a causal factor for black respondents as its effects were seemingly less
impactful among white respondents, with a lowly 32% percent of white South
African respondents, as opposed to an overwhelming 83% percent black
respondents who felt the effect is associated to an heightened intensity of
xenophobia. In a nutshell, the result of Claassen’s survey explicates that
individual’s encounter of experiences with poverty increases xenophobia. Making
poverty not only an effect of xenophobia but also a causal factor of xenophobic
attacks in South Africa. This ultimately diminishes the productivity levels of
black Diaspora’s living in South Africa, which serves as an economic impact of
xenophobic attacks in South Africa. Table below further explains the effects of
poverty on xenophobia.
Conclusion
It is only tenable to say that reforms
at home and aspiration to or actual leadership of the continent are two factors
that shape the current phase of Nigeria-South Africa relations. The character
of Nigeria-South Africa relations changed with the commencement of multi-racial
democracy based on the universal adult suffrage in South Africa and the return
to civilian rule in Nigeria. Anti-apartheid and anti-military policies that previously
defined their relations became irrelevant. Nigeria and South Africa are
regional as well as continental leaders in terms of economy and politics. Their
cordial relationship is pivotal to the advancement and all round development of
Africa. However, evidence abounds that relations between the two countries at
any given conjuncture largely depends on the pursuit of their objectives and
national interests, hence the deep-rooted competition for supremacy.
Again, economic factors have been
identified as major causes the strain in Nigeria and South Africa relations.
Competition for scarce resources is a common factor in ethnic conflicts within
both states. In Nigeria and South Africa, ethnic communities violently compete
for properties, jobs, education, social amenities, healthcare, etc. Both
countries have professed an unwavering commitment to the foreign policy of Afro-centricism.
However, there exists a wide disparity between the two foreign policy objectives
in the sense that while South Africa’s foreign policy is dynamically based on
reciprocal relations, that of Nigeria is rigidly based on sentiment.
Nigeria took practical steps to
discourage apartheid and colonial rule in Africa. Sequel to this, Africa became
the centerpiece of Nigeria’s foreign policy. However, the dynamics of world
affairs as regards diplomacy has made it imperative for Nigeria to adopt
multilateralism with the welfare of her citizens and the health of her economy
as her overriding national interest. While Nigeria remains active in African
affairs, the nation should seek to enhance national development and welfare of
the citizens. Again, Nigeria at the dawn of the 21st Century still
remains largely an amalgam of several groups, language and creeds. It is easy
for the foreign commentators to portray her as a highly disorganized country,
failing to shed into light the challenges faced by the neo-colonial state. Beset
by several social and economic ills. Many Nigerians themselves may speak of the
insecurity of lives and property, complain bitterly about some aspect of the
country’s socio-economic development and decry the wide gaps between the rich
few and the miserable millions. But behind these images of apparent confusion
and the public concern over lingering crises in some quarters, lies the reality
of a nation more hopeful and promising than it was at its birth. For all their
different cleavages, Nigerians are hopeful that the nation’s fortunes will be
much brighter under President Mohammadu Buhari’s new dispensation, than they
ever were in the past.
Recommendations
While it is not possible to eliminate
social tensions in any country, it still remains expedient on the part of the
South African government and its nationals to respect universal and regional treaties,
declarations, norms, protocols and conventions rather than resort to barbarous
acts that have outraged the conscience of Nigerians and Africans. Indeed the
unwholesome politicization of migration as an excuse for xenophobia in South
Africa must be addressed by diplomatic means by both countries. The issues and
factors of migration that include increased unemployment, poverty and greed
must be top in re-tooling the new Nigeria-South Africa partnership. Both
countries must promote and sustain protection mechanisms for human rights and
conducive environments for decent work by migrant workers and their families
whether documented (economic) migrants or undocumented migrants.
i)
Equally, Nigeria has also provided a
robust and unrestricted market for South African businesses like MTN and
Multichoice. Therefore, Nigeria must also forge strategic business alliance in
South Africa to balance the unhealthy business equation. Furthermore, beyond
the existing skewed bilateral and economic relations in favor of South African
businesses in Nigeria, there is an urgent need for both countries to initiate a
liberalized migration regime and a robust migration management capacity towards
enhancing and strengthening the strategic role of Nigerians in the diasporas as
development partner and factoring their contributions to the overall Africa
development agenda for sustainable peace and security.
ii)
The two countries in my view are not
exploiting their leadership and governance roles in sustaining the African
dream and indeed the drive for poverty eradication through the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs). Indeed, South Africa and Nigeria, representing the
two leading economies in Africa, must play leading roles in driving a
sustainable green revolution that would provide food security thereby
contributing significantly to overcoming hunger and social tensions that have
fueled African emigrations. It is imperative for the government under the
leadership of President Muhammadu Buhari to escalate and mainstream key
external relations that are mutually beneficial in ties with South Africa,
while respecting all treaties and obligations on persons and related matters.
iii)
Crucially, sustained job creation
particularly for youths at home and positive image-building abroad would
enhance the respectability of Nigerians in the Diasporas and indeed address the
negative way the world sees us as a people and a nation. Furthermore, our
government at home must understand the relationship between poverty, irregular
migration and the overall issues of xenophobia, which is not new in South
Africa.
iv)
Nigeria’s relevance within the global
system depends on relative strength and control at the domestic level and our
continued relevance within the Africa continent and indeed the changing world.
Against this backdrop, Nigeria’s international communication and reputational
image-building mechanisms must be hinged on diplomatic caution and decency to
safeguard our nationals wherever they are in the globe, beyond the xenophobic
realities in South Africa. In addition, the African union (AU) has to be alive
to its continental responsibilities for the emancipation of Africans from the
clutches of poverty, walking the talk of development for its people across the
continent.
v)
Nigeria’s international engagement
strategy should be done with diplomatic finesse and dexterity and pragmatic
efforts should be pursued to improve on our foreign relations mechanisms,
particularly on the issues of cross-border migration. Nigeria should desire to
play by the rule of international law and its obligations in spite of its
visible failings at home in providing basic social welfare and essential
services for majority of its people who live on less than one dollar a day.
vi)
The challenge of xenophobic attacks
again is wake up call for the Nigerian government to organize its affairs by
improving living conditions at home, as well as strengthening its foreign
policy objectives. Interestingly, South African state security institutions
such as the police and immigration services show no sympathy to black settlers
from other African countries; the xenophobia appears institutionalized and as
such systemic. Therefore, Nigeria’s international diplomacy should not dwell
much on the criticism of the recent xenophobic attacks in South Africa, but rather
much attention should be placed on understanding the dynamics of international
politics, which is a game of selective morality, outrageous paradox and double
standard. Hence, concrete efforts should be made at home to culture an enabling
environment that would create jobs and livelihoods for the common people in
Nigeria. In addition, Nigeria must re-evaluate her diplomatic institutions to
engage the South African government.
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